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[Crim. No. 7916. In Bank. June 30, 1964.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LEE CLYDE 
LAMBRIGHT, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Oriminal Law-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-lrfia. 
cODduet of JUl'7-ReadiDg Newspapers.-It is misconduct for a . 
juror to read newspaper accounts of a case on which he ill 
sitting. 
[2a, 2b] Id.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions.-In· a' mur-
der case where there was little evidence of defendant's motive 
or intent to kill, the trial judge's error in instructing the iar1 
that they had a right to read newspaper articles or listen to 
radio news broadcasts or view televis~on newscasts pertinent to 
the trial was prejudicial, despite the judge's general admoni-
tion to the jury not to consider such evidence in their delibera-
tions, where a newspaper published an article describing testi-
mony, elicited out of the jury's presence and determined to be 1 
inadmissible hearsay, concerning threats by defendant to kill 
the victim, and, in view of the court's erroneous instruction, it . 
was likely that some of the jurors read the article. 
[8] Id.-"l'riaJ.-JUl'J'- OODduet - Polling :Before Verdict.-In a 
homicide prosecution where the court erroneously authorised 
the jurors to read newspaper accounts of the trial, and a paper 
of wide circulation reported damaging hearsay evidence 
offered in the absence of the jury and ruled inadmissible, re- I 
fusal of dhefendaadnt'ths proper request todPdoll the j~rsal 88 to I', . 
whether t ey re e report compoun e the ongm error 
of allowing the jury to read extrajudicial accounts of the 
trial. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.id, Appeal and Error, § 624; Am.Jur.2c1, Appeal ' 
and Error, § 810. 
Kelt. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 1391(3); [2] Crim-
inal Law, § 1414; [3] Criminal Law, § 342. 
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County and from an order denying a new trial. Wil-
liam P. Mahedy, Judge. Judgment reversed; appeal from 
order dismissed. 
Prosecution for murder. JUdgment of conviction of second 
degree murder reversed. 
Burton Marks, under .appointment by the Supreme Court, 
for Defendant and Appellant. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, 'Villiam E. James, As-
sistant Attorney General, and Gilbert F. Nelson, Deputy At-
torney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of 
conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of 
two count.:: of second degree murder. His appeal from the 
order denying his motion for a new trial is dismissed. (Pen. 
Code, § 1237.) 
Defendant had known Alys Tuttle since about 1958. She 
was separated from her husband and was living with Max 
Navarro. Alys sometimes lived at defendant's cottage for 
periods of a few days on occasions when she had quarreled 
with Navarro. Defendant and Alys were both heavy drinkers 
and spent much of their time together consuming alcohol. 
They also had sexual relations. Defendant apparently had 
accepted the fact that Alys chose to live with Navarro, al-
though defendant at one time sought to have Alys marry him 
after she obtained a divorce from her husband. 
At about 6:30 a.m. on the morning of February 7, 1963, 
defendant arrived at Navarro's cottage with a bottle of 
whiskey, which defendant and Alys consumed during the 
morning. Navarro had already left for work when defendant 
arrived. Ernest Mitchell, a fellow employee of Navarro's, 
arrived at the cottage at about 10 a.m., apparently to drive 
Alys to the laundromat as a favor to Navarro. At approxi-
mately 11 :30 a.m. a single shot fired from defendant's 
Mauser rifle passed through Alys and Mitchell killing both of 
them. Defendant returned to his cottage and attempted to 
take his life with the rifle. 
Defendant testified that the shooting was accidental. He 
had purcllased tIle rifle on February 2, 1963, for deer JlUllt-
ing, and after leaving the store loaded the rifle to see if he 
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knew how to do so. He removed the shells, but had difficulty , 
replacing them in their box and put them back in the rifle. 
He then wrapped the weapon in its original wrapping paper 
and put it in the trunk of his car. He thought he engaged the 
rifle's safety mechanism. 
While talking with Alys and Mitchell on the morning of 
February 7, defendant told Alys that he wanted to show her' 
his new rifle. Alys apparently liked venison, and defendant 
claimed that was a reason for his plans to go hunting. De-
fendant went out to the car to get the rifle and when he 
returned AIys was in the kitchen with Mitchell. Defendant 
entered the living room through the front door, stated "Here 
is the gun," and proceeded to unwrap it. He first grasped 
the muzzle with his left hand while taking the paper from 
the stock of the rifle with his right hand. He then held the 
rifle with his right hand and started to remove the paper 
from the muzzle. At this instant the weapon discharged as 
Alys and Mitchell were returning to the living room through 
a doorway from the kitchen and were facing defendant with 
Alys in front of Mitchell. Defendant observed that Alys was 
dead, and in his grief over her death sought to take his own 
life. He claimed that he was intoxicated at the time of the 
shooting. Autopsies showed an 0.26 per cent of alcohol con-
tent in Alys's blood, but no indication that Mitchell had con-
sumed any alcohol. 
The prosecution establislled that the bullet passed approxi-
mately horizontally through the victims at a height of about 
51 inches. There were no powder burns on either body. An 
expert testified that it took approximately five pounds of 
force to' operate the trigger, and tIle jurors were allowed to 
inspect the weapon and test the trigger action. It was shown 
that the ammunition purchased by defendant was inappro-
priate for deer huntil1g1 and that the deer hunting season 
did not begil1 until September or October. 
At the outset of the trial the trial judge instructed the 
jury as follows: "Some judges request juries during the trial 
not to read newspaper articles or listen to radio news broad-
casts or view television newscasts pertinent to the trial that 
they may be sitting on. I don't think that is proper, I don't 
think a Judge' has a right to tell a jury that they can't read 
the newspaper, tllst tlley can't listen to tlle radio, that they 
IDefendant purchll.lled a military round of steeljacketed cartridges, 
which are usually lold for target Ihooting and are illegal for deer 
hunting. 
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can't view television. Now, assume, ladies and gentlemen, 
that during this trial there will be mention of this case in the 
newspaper and in perhaps radio news broadcasts or television 
newscasts, you have a right to listen to those and to view 
them. I believe, as you believe, in freedom of the press. This 
is one of our constitutional guarantees, however, I remind 
you that you must not consider that, if you listen to them or 
if you read about them in the paper, you must simply put 
yourself in the frame of mind that I would have to put 
myself in if I were to decide this case without a jury and 
that is that I can't consider it as far as my evaluation of the 
evidence is concerned. It just means nothing. My evaluation 
of the evidence must come from the lips of the witnesses here 
in the courtroom and from such exhibits as may be intro-
duced in the case, so if you do listen to tllings like that, just 
remember that the law imposes upon you the obligation of 
deciding the case solely and entirely on what you hear from 
the witnesses here in the courtroom and from the exhibits in 
the case." 
During the trial the prosecution sought to introduce hear-
say testimony of Max Navarro of statements .Alys made to 
him. Upon objection by defense counsel, the court excused 
the jury and then considered Navarro's testimony. Navarro 
related that about two weeks before the killings .Alys told 
him that defendant while drinking had said to her, II Some of 
these days I will kill you," to which Alys replied, "You are 
drunk. You are nuts." Navarro further testified that less than 
a week before the killing .Alys told him that defendant had 
said to her, "One of these days I will kill you. I could kill 
you now." Navarro said that neither he nor .Alys took de-
fendant's threats seriously. The trial court sustained defend-
ant's objection and ruled that this testimony was inadmis-
sible hearsay. The jury returned to the courtroom and the 
examination of Navarro was resumed. 
While Navarro was testifying out of the jury's presence 
the proceedings apparently remained public. On the follow-
ing day an article appeared· in the San Diego Evening 
Tribune recQunting Navarro's excluded testimony under the 
headline "Death Threat Told at Trial." This newspaper had 
a circulation in excess of 100,000 copies daily. 
Defense counsel brought tlie article to the attention of the 
court and requested that the jury be polled to determine if 
any of the jurors had read it. The court denied this request. 
When later raised on a motion for a new trial, the court 
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rejected the contention that defendant was prejudiced by the' 
'refusal to poll the jury regarding the newspaper article. The' 
court stated that the jury had been instructed not to consider' 
extrajudicial . evidence, and that defendant had not shown 
that any juror failed to heed this admonition. 
[1] It is misconduct for a juror to read newspaper ac-
counts of a case on which he is sitting. (People v. Lessard, 58 . 
Ca1.2d 447, 454 [25 Ca1.Rptr. 78, 375 P.2d 46]; People v. 
Wong Loung, 159 Cal 520, 524, 526 [114 P. 829] ; PeopZe v. 
'Feld,149 Cal. 464,478 [86 P. 1100]; People v. Chin Non, 146 
Cal. 561, 566 [80 P. 681J ; People v. Stokes, 103 Cal. 193, 196-
199 [37 P. 207, 42 Am..St.Rep. 102J ; see People v. Santo, 48 
Cal.2d 819, 381 [273 P.2d 249]; Pen. Code, § 1181, mbd. 
2.) [9a] The trial court therefore erred in instructing the 
jurors that they had a right to read articles about the trial or 
obtain extrajudicial evidence by radio or television. The I 
prejudicial effect of this error was not removed by the general . 
admonitions to the jury not to consider such evidence in i 
their deliberations. Had the trial court inadvertently admit-
ted Navarro's testimony concerning defendant's alleged 
threats, it is unlikely that even an immediate admonition 
would have cured the prejudicial effect of such inadmissible 
evidence. Tbis case was a close one, for there was little evi-
dence of defendant's motive or intent to kill, the main issue 
in the case. Evidence that defendant had threatened to kill 
Alys relates directly to this main issue, and is of a type that 
would leave an inerasable impression on the jury. (See 
People v. Duncan, 58 Cal2d 803, 818 [8 Cal.Rptr. 351, 350 
P.2d 103J j People v. Hardy, 88 Ca1.2d 52, 61-62. [198 P.2d 
865] jPeople v. W ocltnick, 98 Ca1.App.2d 124, 128 [219 P.2d 
70]; People v. McKelvey, 85 Ca1.App. 769, 771 [260 P. 397].) 
[3] Defendant took every step possible to aScertain whether 
the jurors read the article. In view of the court's erroneous I 
instruction authorizing them to read newspaper accounts of 
the trial it was very likely that some jurors did read the 
article. Defendant's request to poll the jur~' was therefore 
proper. {Cf. People v. Barthel, 204 Oa1.App.2d 776,780 [22 
Cal.Rptr. 599].) In a ease where the jury is correctly ad-
monished not to receive' newspaper or other extrajudicial : 
reports of the trial, it may be a proper exercise of discretion ; 
for the trial court to refuse to poll the jury regarding any I 
specific news media account of the trial. (See People v. Brae, 
73 CalApp.2d 629, 686 [167 P.2d 535]; People v. Phillips, 
120 Ca1.App. 644, 652 [8 P.2d 228].) In such a situation it 
.) 
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may be presumed in the absence of a showing of misconduct 
that the jury heeded the court's admonition. (See PeopZe v. 
Feld, 149 Ca1.464, 478 [86 P. 1100] ; PeopZe v. Torres, 185 
Cal.App.2d 168, 172 [8 Cal.Rptr. 135].) In the present case, 
however, the court's original error of allowing the jury to 
receive extrajudicial accounts of the trial was compounded 
by the refusal to poll the jury. [Ib 1 Since ·the trial court ex-
pressly authorized the jury to read neW$paper accounts of 
the trial, it is reasonably probable that some of the jurors 
did so and that their misconduct, even though innocent, 
affected the result. 2 Accordingly, the error was prejudicial. 
(PeopZe v. Watson,46 Ca1.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and 
Peek, J., concurred. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would affirm the judgment for 
the reasons expressed by Mr. Presiding Justice Griffin in the 
opinion prepared by him for the District Court of Appeal. 
(PeopZe v. Lambright (Ca1.App.) 36 Cal.Rptr. 851.) 
2The fact that a newspaper published an account of testimOJl7 that 
the trial court ruled inadmissible raises serious questions .. to the 
propriety of such reporting. Althougb the protection of the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution may extend in BOme cir-
cumstances to press coverage of judicial proceedings, such rights may be 
outweighed by the defendant's right to a fair trial when the latter right 
is in clear and present danger of obstruction by the news media. (See 
P6ftAe~amp v. ]t'lorida, 328 U.S. 331, 334-336 [66 S.Ct. 1029, 90 L:Ed. 
1295, 1297·1298]; Bridge. v. BtGte of CGlifomia, 314 U.S. 252, 259-263 
[62 S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192, 201·203]. See generally, DIU' Process for 
Whom-NeWBpGper or Defendantf, Comment., 4 Stan.L.Rev. 101.) The 
danger Will apparent in this ease where the trial judge excused the JUT,. 
from the courtroom to consider certain evidence and ruled that the 
evidence was not for the jury's consideration. As stated in People v. 
Bto~eB, 103 Cal. 193, 197 [27 P. 207, 42 Am.St.Rep. 102], "It is 
exceedingly unfortunate that a newspaper should publish such an article 
pending the trial of an important criminal ease. Newspaper comments of 
this character are well calculated to interfere with the due and proper 
administration of justice. The jurors should Jlot have read the article. 
The newspaper .abould not have published it. The publication of such 
articles during the pendency of important trials serves no good purpose, 
but, on the \lontr&r1', tends to impede and adulterate the stream of 
justice." (Sce also People v. Gomez, 41 Ca1.2d 150,161 [258 P.2d 825]; 
People v. Powell, 171 F.Supp. 20ll. 205.) 
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